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Use It And Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right
Under ERISA Section 510 To Engage in Post-Claim
Modifications of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans
CARL A. GREcI*
[This appeal] involves Acqired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"),'
a disease that has .. exacted a heavy toll in terms of human life, and
in terms of the financial burden placed on the health care and insurance
industries. The cost in terms of human life cannot be measured, or, at
tis point, alleviated. This case raises the question of who should bear
the onerous financial burden of this unprecedented disease, and other
similar catastrophic illnesses. 2
INTRODUCTION
Approximately one-half of the American work force receives employee
health benefits3 through employer "self-insured" plans. 4 "Self-insurance"
is almost synonymous with "no insurance." When a company becomes self-
insured, it no longer uses a commercial insurance carrier in the financing
of its benefit plan. Instead, the company pays one-hundred percent of the
benefits out of its own assets. 5 In recent years, the self-insurance phenom-
enon has had a major impact on the terms and provisions of employee
welfare benefit plans.
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; M.G.S.,
1985, Miami Umversity, Oxford, Ohio; B.A., 1983, Indiana Umversity. I would like to thank
Norman Stem, Professor of Law at the Umversity of Alabama (Visiting Professor, 1991-92,
Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloonnngton), for Ins help and guidance. Special thanks
go to Vivian and Mark Greci for their loving support and encouragement.
1. AIDS is caused by an infection of the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV virus").
This tragic disease breaks down a person's uimune system, and is invanably fatal. For a
complete legal and medical discussion, see AIDS: CAsEs AND MATERIALS (Michael L. Closen
et al. eds., 1989).
2. Brief for Appellees at statement regarding oral argument (unnumbered page before i),
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 60 U.S.L.W
3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1992) (No. 91-1283).
3. Several terms are used interchangeably throughout this Note to refer to employee
welfare benefit plans and employee welfare benefits. They include "employee benefit plan"
and "employee benefit," "employee health plan" and "health benefit," and "ancillary benefit
plan" and "ancillary benefit." For ERISA's definition of "employee welfare benefit plan"
and "welfare plan," see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
4. Robert Pear, White House Divided Over AIDS Coverage, SoUTm BEND TarM. (Ind.),
May 18, 1992, at Al; Legal Experts Predict New Areas of AIDS Litigation in the 1990s, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152 (Aug. 7, 1990).
S. For an overview of the self-insurance concept, see 2 HEALTH CARE LAW § 14.10
(Michael G. MacDonald et al. eds., 1985).
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Employers who provide welfare benefits to employees through self-insured
programs fall under the regulatory purview of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 ERISA nummally regulates these
plans, however.7 This regulatory gap led to the emergence of a new cost-
avoidance scheme-the post-claim plan modification. Under post-claim plan
modifications, employers have successfully argued that, barring any con-
tractual provision to the contrary, ERISA allows plan modifications at any
time-even after a beneficiary has filed a claim-solely to avoid the costs
of on-going treatment. While the employer must fully honor the specific
claims made prior to the effective modification date, it aclueves substantial
cost contanment by precluding future claims. Thus, the sooner the employer
alters the plan to exclude the diagnosed condition, the greater the savings.
The diagnosed illness becomes an uninsured or under-insured condition for
which the employee cannot realistically obtain new coverage. This can aptly
be called the "use it and lose it" policy.
Although section 510 was designed to protect employees from interference
by an employer with their rights to welfare benefits, recent court decisions
interpreting section 510 of ERISA give employers the absolute and unfettered
right to make post-claim plan modifications. 8 Prior to McGann v. H & H
Music Co.9 and Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 0 it was unclear whether section
510 would shield employees from an employer's specific intent to modify a
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
ERISA preempts all state statutory and common law relating to pnvate employee benefit
plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. It does not, however, supersede state insurance regulation. Id.
Therefore, whether "self-insurance" is characterized as a state insurance regulation or an
employee benefit plan is important. The Supreme Court has held the latter in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, Ill S. Ct. 403 (1990). Thus, ERISA preempts all state law relating to self-insured
employee benefit plans.
For a complete discussion of ERISA's preemption clause, see infra notes 23-28 and
accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of FMC Corp. v. Holliday, see James R.
Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 DUKE L.J. 1115 (1992).
7. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § i144(b)(2)(B) (1988). See, e.g., Bruner, supra note
6; see also FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. 403, 409-10.
8. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d
401 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 60
U.S.L.W. 3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1992) (No. 91-1283); see also Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F
Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-8696 (11th Cir. July 31, 1991); Levesque
v. Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., No. 90-348-CV-5-4 (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 1991) (holding
that defendant could modify health benefit plan even though it interrupted treatment regimen
of plaintiff); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
Although McGann couches the employer's right in "absolute" terms, an employer must
nevertheless satisfy certain factors in order to validly modify a plan: (1) the employer must
reserve the right to modify benefit 1lans expressly in its Summary Plan Description, see infra
notes 19-22 and accompanying text; (2) the employer must not be bound by contrary contractual
provisions, such as a labor contract or collective bargaimng agreement; and (3) the company
must be self-insured, so as to avoid regulation by state insurance laws.
9. 946 F.2d 401.
10. 773 F Supp. 416.
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plan to reduce benefits for a particular claimant. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in McGann, however, gave employers the absolute right to make
such plan changes. The court found that modifications designed to avoid
payment for a particular employee's claim did not violate section 510. In
Owens, a district court in Georgia also found post-claim plan changes valid
under section 510.
This Note examines McGann" and Owens,12 and concludes that the courts'
myopic reading of the statute conflicts with the broader policy considerations
of ERISA. Part I discusses ERISA in general, and analyzes in particular
the relevant sections preventing discrimnation in the implementation of
employee welfare benefit plans. Part II reviews some of the relevant litigation
under section 510, including post-claim modification cases as well as tra-
ditional discharge cases. This Note concludes that new judicial and legislative
approaches should be taken to improve the effectiveness of section 510 in
protecting individual employees, without jeopardizing the employer's need
to modify plans in order to remain profitable.
I. AN EMPLOYER'S RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ERISA IN THE
PROVISION OF WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS
A. ERISA's General Purpose
Congress passed ERISA in 1974 to make uniform the laws regulating
private employee pension and welfare benefit plans.13 Prior to its enactment,
a variety of state and federal 4 laws regulated pension and welfare benefit
11. McGann, 946 F.2d 401.
12. Owens, 773 F. Supp. 416.
13. At the time of ERISA's passage, Congress was primarily concerned with the need to
regulate pension plans, rather than welfare benefit plans. The increasing frequency of abuse
in pension plan management in the 1960s demonstrated the ineffectiveness of existing regulations
and common law in managing private sector pensions. David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PrrT. L. REv. 427, 443
(1987). Given the fact that approximately 30 million people were covered in private sector
pension plans, id., it is not surprising that the vast majority of ERISA's provisions regulate
pension benefit plans. Similarly, the legislative history deals almost exclusively with pension
benefit plans. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4640. Nonetheless, the few provisions directed toward welfare benefit plans play an
extremely prominent, and sometimes exclusive, role in the administration of these plans.
For a thorough discussion of ERISA's history, purpose, and policy, see Gregory, supra, at
437-48. See also Michael S. Gordon, ERISA, ESOPs and Senator Javits: The Mind of a
Reformer, 7 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 3 (1988); Nancy J. Altman & Theodore R. Marmor, ERISA
and the American Retirement Income System, 7 AM. 1. TAX PoL'Y 31 (1988); Alicia H.
Munnell, ERISA -The First Decade: Was the Legislation Consistent With Other National Goals?,
19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51 (1985).
14. Some examples of the various federal provisions are the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (repealed 1975), and the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
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plans. Such regulations often did not protect the employee adequately.
In its lofty declaration of policy, Congress spoke of the huge growth of
employee benefit plans, their effect on the national public interest, and their
close relationship to the well-being of beneficiaries and their dependents. 5
Iromcally, however, ERISA does not require an employer to provide benefits
to its employees.16 In an attempt to balance the needs of employees to have
benefits with those of employers to control costs, Congress provided for a
voluntary system. Under ERISA, employers have no affirmative obligation
to provide benefits.17 Only if an employer chooses to institute a pension or
benefit plan does ERISA come into play.
15. The basic policy provisions of ERISA are outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988):
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY
(A) BENEIT PLANS AS AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in
recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact
of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected
with a national public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability
of employment and the successful development of industrial relations; that they have become
an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their activities, and of
the activities of their participants, and the employers, employee organizations, and other entities
by which they are established or maintained;. . that owing to the lack of employee information
and adequate safeguards concermng their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce,
that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation,
and administration of such plans; that despite the enormous growth in such plans many
employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to
the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current lmmum
standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds
have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated
benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries,
. that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and
their financial soundness.
(B) PROTECTION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND BENEFICIARIES BY REQUIRING DISCLOSURE AND
REPORTING, SETTING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, ETC., FOR FIDUCIARIES
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
(C) PROTECTION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER, AND BENEFICIARIES BY
VESTING OF ACCRUED BENEFITS, SETTING MINIMUM STANDARDS OF FUNDING, REQUIRING TERMI-
NATION INSURANCE
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect the interests of
participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character
and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees
with significant periods of service, to meet mimmum standards of funding, and by requiring
plan termination insurance.
16. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639




B. Employee Welfare Benefit Plans Under ERISA
1. Employee Welfare Benefit Defined
ERISA broadly defines an employee welfare benefit plan as follows:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan"
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organiza-
tion, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its parti-
cipants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services .. .1
As is evident, almost any nonpension benefit provided to an employee falls
under the definition of welfare benefit. The breadth of included benefits is
mirrored by the actual benefit plans provided by employers. Some provide
no employee benefits at all, some offer a minimal package, and others
provide elaborate benefit packages. If an employer offers benefit plans to
employees, the plans must comply with certain statutory provisions requiring
the employer to adequately inform the employee of the availability and
terms of the benefits.i 9
2. ERISA Requires a Summary Plan Description
The primary manner in which employers provide employees with infor-
mation pertaining to their benefit plans is via a Summary Plan Description
(SPD). Section 102 of ERISA provides that:
(a)(1) A summary plan description of any employee benefit plan shall
be furnished to participants and beneficiaries ... [This] shall include
the information described in subsection (b), shall be written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall
be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan..
(b) The plan description and summary plan description shall contain
the following information: . . a description of the relevant provisions
of any applicable collective bargaining agreement; the plan's require-
ments respecting eligibility for participation and benefits; a description
of the provisions providing for nonforfeitable pension benefits; circum-
stances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or
loss of benefits; the source of financing of the plan and the identity of
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1002.
19. See id. § 1022.
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any organization through which benefits are provided; the date of the
end of the plan year and whether the records of the plan are kept on
a calendar, policy, or fiscal year basis; the procedures to be followed
in presenting claims for benefits under the plan and the remedies
available under the plan for the redress of claims which are demed in
whole or in part (including procedures required under section 503 of
this Act).20
Consistent with the overall purpose of ERISA, the case law regarding SPDs
has generally been construed liberally in favor of employees. Courts have
interpreted SPDs to prevent injustice when plan administrators fail to inform
covered participants of the provisions of the plan.2i Most Importantly,
courts have held that any ambiguities or inconsistencies in the plan or the
SPD must be resolved in favor of the employee and made binding against
the drafter.22 However, an employer 'can expressly reserve the right to
modify or terminate the plan at any time and under any circumstances,
leaving employees no cause of action under section 510 when the modifi-
cation or termination interrupts the treatment regimen. This can result in
de immis coverage or in no coverage at all.23
While employees are entitled to all the information needed to use and
maintain welfare benefits, employers can retain the right to modify or
terminate the plan at will. This creates a paradoxical situation. Because an
SPD arguably promotes benefit usage, it may likewise increase an employer's
incentive to discharge an employee or change plan benefits. That is, by
promoting benefit usage, an SPD may simultaneously and unintentionally
increase plan modifications. Given that regulatory provisions of ERISA
preempt almost all state insurance regulation, such a result is disconcerting.
3. ERISA Preempts Almost All State Statutory and Common
Law Relating to Employee Benefits
Primary to understanding the law of employee welfare benefits is recog-
nizing that ERISA preempts almost all state statutory and common law
20. Id.
21. Boutillier v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, Inc., 713 P.2d 1110 (Wash. App. 1986), review
denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1005 (1986).
22. Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Kochendorfer
v. Rockdale Sash and Trim Co., 653 F Supp. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Edwards v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988); McKnight v. Southern Life and Health
Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (lith Cir. 1985).
23. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co.,
60 U.S.L.W 3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1992) (No. 91-1283); Alday v. Container Corp. of Am., 906
F.2d 660, 663 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W 3460 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1991) (No. 90-
685); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988); Musto v.
American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989);
Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1987); Hamilton v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1985). The reasoning of such cases, however, is subject to
attack. See infra notes 51-88 and accompanying text.
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concerning employee benefits.24 An important exception to the superceding
provision is section 514(b)(2)(A), which states that ERISA will not preempt
state law regulating insurance.25 While it is arguably necessary to standardize
the pension and welfare benefit systems, the preemption clause has gutted
existing state causes of action for which there is no federal counterpart.
Without guidance from Congress as to whether preempted state law and
other state issues are relevant in developing a federal common law of
employee benefits, courts have interpreted preemption rigidly. Tins has led
to court decisions that are plainly inequitable and contradictory, and that
promote bad public policy. Not surprisingly, the preemption clause has been
strongly criticized as a failure. 26 Indeed, the McGann case itself has generated
additional commentary with regard to preemption.27 While a complete
analysis of ERISA's preemption clause and the subsequent development, or
lack thereof, of a federal common law of employee benefits is beyond the
scope of tins Note, preemption is relevant here because the defendants in
both McGann and Owens became self-insured as part of the plan modifi-
cation process. Since self-insured plans are subject to preemption under
ERISA,2 the employers were able to circumvent state insurance law which
would have made the modifications m question illegal. 29
II. DISCHARGE AND DISCRMNATION UNDER SECTION 510
An employee may have redress under section 5100 against an employer
for interfering in his or her participation in a welfare benefit plan. Section
510, in relevant part, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discrinunate against a participant or beneficiary for exer-
cising any right to wich he is entitled under the provisions of an
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). Tis has been aptly referred to as "one of the most sweeping
.preemption clauses ever included in any federal legislation." Gregory, supra note 13, at 430-
32. In one fell swoop, federal law expressly replaced, with few exceptions, an entire body of
state law. Id., see also Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial
Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MNcH. J.L. REP. 109 (1985).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1i44(b)(2)(B).
26. Bruner, supra note 6; Irish & Cohen, supra note 24, at 163 ("The language of ERISA
section 514(a) has made it umpossible to develop a sound or internally consistent jurisprudence
of ERISA preemption."); see also Amato v. Western Umon Int'l Inc., 596 F Supp. 963(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986); Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301 (3d
Cir. 1982) (showing the court's rigid interpretation of preemption).
27. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 6.
28. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
29. Part III of this Note will comment on preemption as it relates to the McGann and
Owens cases. It will further suggest future congressional revision of ERISA's regulation of
employee welfare benefit plans.
30. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
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employee benefit plan . or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan. . It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge,
fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he [or
she] has given information or has testified . in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to tlus Act.. .3'
Under section 510, if an employee is entitled to a welfare benefit, the
employer is prohibited from penalizing that individual for exercising such
a right.
Cases under section 510 are generally of two types: discharge 2 and
discrimination. The prototype discharge case typically involves a situation
where the defendant-employer discharges the plaintiff-employee for an alleged
legal reason.3 However, the plaintiff-employee claims that the real reason
for the discharge is the plaintiff-employee's use or expected use of welfare
benefits and the defendant-employer's desire to avoid or limit benefit costs. 4
If the plaintiff-employee can muster enough evidence to prove the defendant-
employer's improper motive, which the defendant-employer is unable to
rebut, the employee will prevail.
In discrinunation cases, an employee typically alleges unequal treatment
because an employer explicitly terminates or modifies a benefit plan to
exclude or reduce coverage to avoid the cost of a claim filed by an individual
or a group. 35 As in discharge cases, the employee alleges that employer's
31. Id.
32. While this Note discusses discharge cases briefly, more detailed analyses can be found
in James Monroe Smith, HIV/AIDS and Workplace Discrimination: Dickens Revsited--"It
Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times," 22 U. WEST L.A. L. RaY. 19 (1991);
Joan Vogel, Containing Medical Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does
Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NoTRE DiAm L. Ray. 1024 (1987); William C.
Martucci & John L. Utz, Unlawful Interference with Protected Rights Under ERISA, 2 LAB.
L.J. 251 (1986); Terry Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510-A Further Limitation on Arbitrary
Discharges, 10 INDus. REL. L.J. 319 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that,
where plaintiff claimed he was terminated in retaliation for and to avoid former wife's attempt
to collect health benefits under company's plan, "[t]his is precisely the type of action that
section 510 sought to cover and that is essential to the Act's protection"). In another case,
the plaintiff in a class action claimed that Ins employer discharged him and other employees
to avoid paying life and medical insurance benefits. The court rejected the defendant's "novel
theory" that the plaintiff, a "participant," could not attain additional rights as a "beneficiary,"
and concluded that "ERISA is thus a remedial statute, the coverage of which should be
liberally construed, and exemptions from which should be confined to their narrow purpose."
Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see also
Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that company's claims
that plaintiff was discharged for cause were mere pretexts where plaintiff alleged employer
terminated him in order to avoid ongoing treatment associated with multiple sclerosis).
34. See Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 586; Kross, 701 F.2d 1238; Folz, 594 F Supp. 1007.
35. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 60 U.S.L.W
3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1992) (No. 91-1283); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D.
Ga. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-8696 (11th Cir. July 31, 1991); see also Levesque v.
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goal is to minimize the cost of the plan. Unlike the discharge scenario,
however, the employer reduces costs not by discharging the employee or
discriminating directly against him, but by modifying the plan to apply to
all beneficiaries. 6
Common factual themes bind post-claim plan modification cases. First,
the plan participant or beneficiary incurs a covered illness that requires him
or her to file a claim through the plan for ongoing treatment. Second, the
employer becomes aware of the illness, either from the employee directly
or by the actual filing of a claim for benefits. Third, the employer proceeds
to modify the plan to exclude or provide only de mimnms coverage for the
diagnosed ilness.37 Additionally, decisions in both group and individual
cases hold that "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any
particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe discrmunation in the
provision of employee benefits."3 8
A. ERISA in Court: Setting the Stage for McGann and Owens
To establish that an employer has unlawfully discriminated against an
employee or group of employees in violation of section 510, courts have
developed a fairly rigid legal standard which plaintiffs must meet.39 In order
to establish a prima facie case under section 510, "the employee must
demonstrate (1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of
interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee [is
or] may become entitled."' 4 A new twist to the equation was added in
Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., No. 90-3488-CV-S4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 1991) (permitting
defendant to modify health benefit plan even though it interrupted treatment regimen "of
plaintiff); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
36. Vogel, 728 F Supp. 1210, discussed below, is an atypical discrumnation case. In Vogel,
the plan was modified to expressly exclude the plaintiff from coverage. Id. at 1216. Arguably,
this is a much easier case to decide.
37. E.g., McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
38. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983), quoted in McGann, 946 F.2d at
406; see also Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 889 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 11I S. Ct. 43 (1990); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (i1th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350, 1351-52
(8th Cir. 1985); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees,
740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
39. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
979 (1987). Gavalik is the leading case regarding the appropriate standard by which § 510
claims should be measured. Id. at 852. Other courts have followed Gavalik in requiring specific
intent. See, e.g., Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that employee must prove employer's specific intent to retaliate for employee's exercise of
rights under plan), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 53 (1990); Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762,
770 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that employee must prove specific intent to interfere with
employee's pension rights); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that § 510 claimant must prove specific intent to engage in activity prohibited
by § 510).
40. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852.
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Deeming v. American Standard, Inc. 41 In Deeming, the court stated that
"a fundamental prerequisite to a [section] 510 action is an allegation that
the employer-employee relationship... was changed in some discriminatory
or wrongful way." 42 This last element makes it virtually impossible for a
plaintiff's post-claim modification action to succeed beyond summary judg-
ment when the plaintiff is still employed by the employer.
Prior to Deeming, a district court in Missouri found a section 510 violation
without such a requirement. In Vogel v. Independence Federal Savings
Bank,43 family members of the decedent, Leonard Vogel, brought an action
asserting, inter alia, a violation of ERISA's nondiscrimination provision. In
1975, while holding several offices with the defendant-bankM Vogel was
enrolled, at Is own request, in the bank's life and health insurance plan.
Seven years later, Vogel suffered a stroke that left him totally disabled.45
The insurance plan, which had no cap on major medical coverage, continued
to pay for Vogel's care. In response, the insurance carrier increased prem-
iums substantially to recoup some of the expenditures attributed to Vogel.
At the same time, federal regulators were pressuring the bank to improve
its financial position. Due to these factors, the bank changed insurance
carriers in 1985. The new plan covered all employees except Vogel,4 whom
it expressly excluded. Less than two years later, the bank re-enrolled with
its original carrier, again leaving Vogel without coverage. Shortly thereafter,
Vogel died. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming "[m]ere
termunation of benefits . . does not constitute unlawful interference" under
section 510. 47 The court found otherwise and held that the facts stated a
claim under section 510.41
In contrast, federal district courts have allowed employers to modify
health benefit plans "so as to deny benefits to a member of a plan during
the course of a treatment regimen." '49 The two cases discussed next both
involved employee beneficiaries diagnosed with AIDS who began using
health benefits available under the plan to treat the disease. The employees
41. 905 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 1127.
43. 728 F Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
44. Vogel was on the board of directors and served as chairman of the bank's loan
committee, vice president of the bank, and appraiser for a bank subsidiary. Id. at 1214.
45. Id. at 1215.
46. There was some contention as to whether Vogel was actually an employee of the bank.
However, for the purposes of summary judgment, the court determined that Vogel was an
employee. Id. at 1225.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1226.
49. Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991), appeal docketed, No.
91-8696 (11th Cir. July 31, 1991); see McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392 (S.D.
Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg
v. H & H Music Co., 60 U.S.L.W 3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1991) (No. 91-1283).
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then lost their benefits when the employer terminated the existing plan and
instituted a new plan which included a cap on AIDS-related coverage. 0
Both plaintiffs filed suit claiming discrimnnation under section 510 and both
lost on summary judgment.
B. McGann v. H & H Music Co.
John McGann began working for the defendant-employer in 1982. He
was diagnosed with AIDS in 1987. Through July, 1988, he used available
health care benefits under the employer's plan. In July, 1988, the employer
became self-insured, 5' made imnor changes to the terms of the plan,52 and
reduced the maximum life time benefit for AIDS-related illnesses from one
million to five thousand dollars.53
McGann alleged discrimination under ERISA section 510. 54 McGann
claimed that the employer terminated the original group health plan because
he submitted claims for treatment of a covered illness, and the employer
did not want to pay for his ongoing treatment. According to McGann, such
cancellation of benefits constituted "discriminat[ion] against a [plan] par-
ticipant ... for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of ... [the] plan." 55 Alternatively, McGann averred discni-
nation based on the fact that the five thousand dollar cap on AIDS and
AIDS-related illnesses was directed at, and solely affected, him.
The district court held that an employer "legally [has] the right to make
changes in its group medical plan." 56 The court found that the employer
complied with the relevant portions of ERISA in modifying its benefit
plan. 7 Since an employer has discretion in providing welfare benefit plans,
50. Most state insurance laws, including Texas and Georgia, where McGann and Owens
were decided, prohibit insurance carriers from placing cost-caps on different illnesses. Susan
B. Garland, Sure, You Can Get Sick-But Not Too Sick, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 1990, at 40; see
also Jerry Geisel, Self-Insurers Can Limit AIDS Benefits: Court, Bus. INs., Aug. 6, 1990, at
i; Company May Place Cap on AIDS Benefits Without Violating ERISA, Judge Rules, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-3 (July 20, 1990). However, since state insurance laws do not
apply to self-insured plans, the employers were able to evade these provisions.
51. For a discussion of the significance of self-insurance, see supra notes 5-8 and accom-
panying text.
52. For example, the individual calendar year deductible was increased substantially, all
treatment for chemical dependency was eliminated, and the new plan included a Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO) network. Brief for Appellee at 5, McGann (No. 90-2672).
53. McGann, 742 F Supp. at 393.
54. Brief for Appellant at 11, McGann (No. 90-2672).
55. Id. at 11, 12 (citation omitted).
56. McGann, 742 F Supp. at 394.
57. First, "[a]ccording to ERISA every employer must provide its employees with a
summary plan description ('SPD'). 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1). The SPD must be written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant "' Id. at 394.
Furthermore, "ERISA does not create liability . where no contract prohibits or prevents
such change." Id. (citation omitted).
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the court reasoned an employer has the absolute right to modify or terminate"8
the plan in any way it sees fit so long as it retains the right to do so m its
summary plan descnption and is not bound by any contractual provisions
to the contrary 19 Thus, the court found it unnecessary to address McGann's
alternative claim of discrimination based on the cost-cap because the em-
ployer's action did not constitute prohibited conduct.6 "McCann [sic] was
not entitled to health benefits whose terms never change." 6' Additionally,
although it was not necessary to its holding, the court noted that the
employer had a legitimate business reason for modifying the plan.
2
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the employer
has an absolute right to modify a plan.63 The court noted that "Congress
did not intend that ERISA circumscribe employers' control over the content
of benefit plans they offered to their employees."" Because the plan could
be modified or terminated at any time so long as the employer says so
clearly in the summary plan description, 6 McGann could not establish any
58. Id. at 394 (citing Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1985)). In
another case, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant employer who modified
its health plan to limit hospitalization days for conditions related to mental illness to 60 days
per annum. The beneficiary-plaintiff, who required hospitalization in excess of 60 days, was
in the middle of a treatment regimen when the modification was made. Levesque v. Marathon
Elec. Mfg. Corp., No. 90-3488-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 1, 1991) (citing Hamilton, 752
F.2d 1350).
59. "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does
not itself proscribe discrinunation in the provision of employee benefits." McGann, 742 F
Supp. at 393 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)).
60. Id. at 394.
61. Id.
62. Specifically, the court cited the defendant's assertion that the plan "suffered serious
financial losses." Id. at 393.
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id. at 407. For example, even if coverage for Alzheimer's disease and coverage for
AIDS present equal costs to the employer and the employer seeks to reduce costs, the employer
may completely reduce coverage for one illness and leave the other coverage intact. As will
be discussed in Part III of this Note, perhaps a fairer approach would be to require pro rata
reductions across all benefit categories when employers engage in post-claim plan modifications.
Indeed, AIDS is no more costly to treat than many other life-threatemng illnesses. See Eric
C. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrmination Against AIDS Victims: Falling Through
the Gaps of Federal Law-ERISA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1247, 1259 (1991) (noting that heart attacks and organ transplants
continue to be covered even though expenses for these can far outstrip expenses related to
AIDS); see also Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?,
100 HARv. L. Rrv. 1782, 1794-95 (1987).
65. The court cited numerous authorities for the proposition that 'ERISA does not
mandate that employers provide any particular benefits,' and does not itself proscribe discrinm-
ination in the provision of employee benefits." McGann, 946 F.2d at 406 (citing Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)); see also Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 889 F.2d
1346, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, liI S. Ct. 43 (1988); Philips v. Amoco Oil Co.,
799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Hamilton v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1985); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement
Program, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
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right under the plan to which he was or could become entitled. He was
only entitled to the benefit for as long as the company chose to provide it.
Thus, he failed to show the specific discriminatory intent required under
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co.6
Although McGann attempted to analogize his situation to Vogel's, the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Vogel. It pointed out that the plan ternmnation
in that case expressly affected only Vogel, and could not affect another7
Even if the employer specifically intended to avoid paying for McGann's
care, the fact that the termination and modification in McGann's case
affected all beneficiaries precluded a discrimination claim under section 510.
Likewise, even if the employer modified the plan based on a general
prejudice against AIDS victims, section 510 would not protect McGann and
other AIDS victims.6s While the court paid lip service to the possibility of
a claim based on specific discriminatory intent, the court essentially stated
that an employer's purpose in instituting the changes was irrelevant. 69
The court's decision is open to challenge despite its reliance in part on
Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy.70 Although Aronson stated
that section 510 is directed against discriminatory conduct targeted at
individuals rather than discriminatory conduct affecting merely the terms
of an employee benefit plan, it also stated that section 510 could possibly
apply to a plan modification that "intentionally benefit[ed], or mjur[ed]
... a certain group of employees."'" Under Aronson, if the modification
demonstrates "invidious intent" without a "readily apparent business jus-
tification," a section 510 action may be availabie.7 Given this, is H & H
Music's motive irrelevant, as the Fifth Circuit seems to believe? 73 A plan
66. 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
67. McGann, 946 F.2d at 405-06. In holding that Vogel was not applicable, the court
expressly refused to comment on whether it felt Vogel was properly decided. Id. at 406.
68. Id. at 408.
69. Id. at 404-05, 408. Specifically, the court stated:
We assume that the defendants' knowledge of McGann's illness was a
motivating factor in their decision to reduce coverage for AIDS-related expenses,
that this knowledge was obtained either through McGann's filing of claims or
his meeting with defendants, and that McGann was the only plan beneficiary
then known to have AIDS.
We assume that discovery of McGann's condition-and realization of the
attendant, long-term costs of caring for McGann--did in fact prompt defendants
to reconsider the $1,000,000 limit with respect to AIDS-related expenses and to
reduce the limit for future such expenses to $5,000.
Id. at 404 n.4, 405 n.6.
70. 730 F.2d 12 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. dented, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984). Aronson involved an
action by former employees to recover benefits that they believed were due under a profit-
sharing plan. The court held that the plan authorized a partial termnation, and that the
employer complied with those provisions. Id. at 15-16.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id.
73. See McGann, 946 F.2d at 405, 408.
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modification made because of a personal bias against McGann or people
with AIDS could certainly be characterized as invidious. Indeed, commen-
tators have noted that since the cost of AIDS treatment is "not necessarily
greater than those related to other life-threatening illnesses normally covered
without question by health plans, . . singling out HIV infection ... for
exclusions or caps does not have an objective justification." 74 McGann also
argued that section 510 is modeled after section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),75 which prohibits an employer from discrim-
inating in hiring or tenunng of employment to "encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. ' 76 If successful, such an interpre-
tation would convert otherwise legal plan modifications into section 510
violations, if made for a retaliatory or discriminatory reason.
McGann cited ERISA's legislative history to support his contention.
During debate on ERISA, Senator Vance Hartke (D. Ind.) referred to
section 8(a)(3) when explaining section 510: "[S]ection [510] . .. made it
illegal to 'discharge, fine, suspend, expell [sic], discipline or discriminate'
against plan participants to defeat rights under the act or a plan. The
language parallels section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act and
should do the trick . ... ."77 At the time of Hartke's statement, courts had
already interpreted section 8(a)(3) in such a way as to convert what would
otherwise be legal employer conduct into an NLRA violation due to anti-
umon ammus.
7 s
74. Arthur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of HIV Infection in the Workplace, 5 NoTR
DAmE L.J. ETmics & PuB. POL'Y 53, 71 (1990); see, e.g., Smith, supra note 32, at 45 (arguing
that it is probably discriminatory to place a cap on HIV/AIDS claims when there are numerous
other costly diseases). Smith provides numerous sources citing the notion that there are other
diseases more costly than AIDS that have an impact on the assets of employer-provided welfare
benefit plans. Id. at 45 n.74.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
by discruination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.").
While McGann's § 8(a)(3) argument is based on ERISA's legislative history, at least one
commentator has suggested that analysis under § 510 should be more lenient toward the
employee than § 8(a)(3). See Vogel, supra note 32 at 1052.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
77. 119 CONG. Rac. 30,374 (1973) (statement of Sen. Hartke); see Lojek v. Thomas, 716
F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1983); West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).
78. For example, the Supreme Court has held that while an employer may liqmudate his
entire business regardless of motive, an employer commits a § 8(a)(3) violation when it closes
part of its business if the purpose is to discourage unionism. Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1965). For additional cases, see NLRB v. Southern
Beverage Co., 423 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1970); see also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965);
NLRB v. Ene Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). More recent decisions have been consistent
with these precedents. For examples, see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 n.6
(1984); Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 946, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(explaining that the key question to be determined under § 8(a)(3) is .'whether the employer's
actions are motivated by anti-umon considerations') (quoting NLRB v. Berger Transfer &
Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 691 (7th Cir. 1982)), cert. denied sub. nom. A.G. Boone Co. v.
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Under this section 8(a)(3) analogy, H & H Music's admission that it
modified the plan to specifically avoid McGann's medical claim thus could
be construed as retaliation for having filed a claim. The changes may also
have been discriminatory if McGann could have proven that they were
based on a desire to exclude benefits to him exclusively, or on a general
prejudice against people with AIDS. 79 In any situation, the court should
examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the modification to decide
whether the employer modified the plan in a discriminatory manner or for
a retaliatory reason.8 0
McGann's case would have survived summary judgment had the court
entertained this line of argument. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit avoided
the entire intent issue. It found that a plan modification which applies to
all plan participants, at least in theory, is not prohibited employer conduct,
pure and simple. Thus, because of the court's reasomng, McGann failed to
get to first base. The court's analysis leaves a huge gap in section 510's
protection. As will be discussed briefly in Part III, an interpretation of
section 510 that incorporates a section 8(a)(3)-like intent factor is needed
to give full effect to the statute and avoid absurd results.
Another difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's decision is its reliance on Moore
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.81 The Moore court added judicial gloss
to ERISA's legislative history. The court found that Congress rejected
automatic vesting plans because employers need the freedom to control
rising and unpredictable health care costs. In defending post-claim plan
modifications, it noted that Congress recognized the employer's need to
change the level of the benefits provided to employees due to inflation and
changing technology.82 While this interpretation seems credible in today's
health-care economy,8 3 the fact that Congress chose not to require vesting
of welfare benefits does not necessarily mean that employers have the
unfettered right to modify their plans to adversely affect an employee after
he or she becomes ill and files a claim.
NLRB, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989). See also Vogel, supra note 32, at 1026, 1046-56 (arguing that §
8(a)(3) and relevant provisions of other remedial labor statutes provide principles and ap-
proaches for interpreting and extending § 510).
79. Leonard, supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80. Southern Beverage, 423 F.2d at 720.
81. 856 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1988).
82. McGann, 946 F.2d at 407 (quoting Metropolitan Life, 856 F.2d at 492). While this
argument is unsupported in ERISA's legislative history, it is not completely without reason.
Locking employers into a specific benefit package without any means to modify it could result
in one of two outcomes: either the employers will go bankrupt or they will provide de mimmis
benefits to avoid risking financial ruin. In either case, both the employer and employee lose.
Employers either end up with a ruined business or have difficulty attracting good workers
because of limited benefit packages. Employees either are out of a job after the plan bankrupts
the company or else are forced to accept positions with minimal benefits.
83. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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The Moore court cites the following legislative history to support its claim
that employers have an absolute right to modify employee benefit plans at
any time:
[The term "accrued benefit" refers to pension or retirement benefits
and is not intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as medical
insurance or life insurance, which are sometimes provided for employees
in conjunction with a pension plan, and are sometimes provided sepa-
rately. To require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously
complicate the admstration and increase the cost of plans whose
primary function is to provide retirement income.8
Reliance on this legislative history is completely inapt. This legislative history
concerns welfare benefits within a pension plan, not the welfare benefit
plan itself as in McGann. Congress merely determined that welfare benefits
within a pension plan would not vest. The quoted language has nothing to
do with whether an employer can modify a plan to avoid paying for a
participant's benefits after he or she gets sick.
The judicial gloss of the Moore court, despite its plausibility, misses the
point. There is little evidence that Congress intended to give employers the
absolute, unfettered right to modify their benefit plans. The courts, then,
should decide this question under the federal common law of ERISA,
perhaps using general contract principles."3 Alternatively, rather than allow
the employer to reserve the absolute right to modify plans merely by saying
in the summary plan description that the plan can be modified at any time
for any reason, the courts should require more explicit language. One
alternative would be to require the employer to actually state m unequivocal
language that it reserves the right to change the plan even if the employee
gets sick and even if the purpose of the change is to shift the cost of care
from the plan to the employee. Granted, the result may not be any fairer,
but at least the employee would have adequate notice.
In a situation where the legislative history is silent on an issue, basic
canons of statutory construction require that courts devise a statutory
interpretation that does not achieve an absurd result. Nevertheless, the
McGann court promotes such absurd results.
Under the McGann court's philosophy, an employee has a valid claim
when his employer fires him to avoid paying for his treatment.8 6 Yet, an
employee does not have a valid claim when the same employer modifies the
84. Metropolitan Life, 856 F.2d at 491 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4670, 4726; S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4890, 4935).
85. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 32, at 1061.
86. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989); Kross v.
Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1983); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F.
Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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benefit plan to avoid paying for the same employee's treatment. s7 A rule
that permits a cause of action for a section 510 violation when the employer
fires the employee, but not when the employer continues to employ the
worker can be characterized only as absurd. Such an interpretation also
leaves a huge gap in the statute's enforcement mechanism as it relates to
welfare benefits. If ERISA is a remedial statute to be liberally construed in
favor of the participant beneficiary,"8 and such statutes should be interpreted
so as not to produce absurd results, the courts have put the wrong gloss
on the statute in permitting employers to achieve with post-claim modifi-
cations what they could not achieve through wrongful discharge.
C. Owens v. Storehouse, Inc.
A similar case decided almost simultaneously with McGann achieved the
same result.8 9 Richard Owens was diagnosed with AIDS in November, 1988.
He received about $116,000 in health benefits under his employer's plan,
which contained a $1,000,000 lifetime benefit. In October, 1990, the com-
pany became self-insured and placed a $25,000 cap on AIDS-related claims.
It notified Owens that he was ineligible for additional benefits. 90
Owens sued under section 510 and simultaneously sought a temporary
restraining order to direct the employer to continue paying benefits for the
treatment of Is AIDS-related health problems.9' The court reluctantly denied
the order, noting that the employer had a legitimate business purpose for
making changes. 92 The company's reasons aside, the court found disturbing
87. McGann, 946 F.2d 401; Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991),
appeal docketed, No. 91-8696 (ilth Cir. July 31, 1991).
88. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1980).
89. Owens, 773 F Supp. 416.
90. To be fair to the company, it should be noted that:
[a]Ithough the AIDS limitation was made effective March 1, 1990, defendant
continued to honor approximately $90,000 worth of plaintiff's claims in excess
of the $25,000 cap because the claims expenenced as a whole for the first half
of the 1990 plan year were running less than budget. By October, however, this
benevolence had to end as the financial condition of both the plan and the
company detenorated. After appnsmg plaintiff by letter of its intention to adhere
strictly to the modified terms of its employee benefit plan, defendant forwarded
plaintiff an additional $7500 as a 'transitional' benefit.
Id. at 418.
91. Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F Supp. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (denying restraimng
order) [hereinafter Owens I, to distinguish it from case of same name appeanng at 773 F.
Supp. 416].
92. The plaintiff was one of five employees who had AIDS out of a total work force of
160. The employer contended that its decision to modify the plan was driven by the fact that
it faced a "substantial premium increase and other limitations" from its reinsurer. Id. at 415.
Additionally, the employer submitted financial data to the court under seal. The court, upon
reviewing the data, concluded that the employer had a "most legitimate business reason for
modifying the plan to cap its exposure for medical benefits payable to AIDS-infected [sic]
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the specter that ERISA permits a plan to be modified "so as to deny
benefits to a member of a plan during the course of a treatment regimen." 93
Nevertheless, in granting the defendant's summary judgment, the court
abandoned its concerns with a "legitimate business purpose" and adopted
the reasoning in Deeming 4 The court distinguished between actions affecting
the benefit plan and actions affecting the employee-employer relationship.
Quoting Deeming, the court held that an employee had no cause of action
for the latter 95 and noted that 'section 510 of ERISA simply is not the
appropriate vehicle for redressing the unilateral elimination of severance
benefits accomplished independently of employee termination or harass-
ment.'"96
The Owens court's reliance on Deeming is unfortunate as the decision in
Deeming is not strongly supported. Deeming cites Senator Hartke's state-
ment made in support of section 510 during Senate debate of ERISA.
Senator Hartke wanted to make sure that section 510 would protect em-
ployees who were discharged by employers just prior to vesting, not that
ERISA section 510 protected terminations exclusively 9 Senator Javits, to
whom Hartke addressed the questions, merely affirmed that section 510
would provide a remedy to those who are discriminatorily discharged.
Deeming points to this legislative history to support its proposition that
a fundamental change in the employee-employer relationship must occur to
have a section 510 claim. However, the entire discussion between Senator
Hartke and Senator Javits was limited to the context of employers discharg-
ing employees immediately prior to vesting. The language of section 510 is
much broader than vesting. Merely because the legislative history suggests
section 510 is applicable when there is a change in the employee-employer
relationship, it does not necessarily follow that section 510 protects em-
ployees only in such situations.
The Owens court also relies, in part, on West v. Butler.9 In this case,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that "it appears Congress designed section 510
primarily to protect the employment relationship that gives rise to an
individual's pension rights."' ' However, the term "primarily" is equivocal.
plan members. If the plaintiff's motion were granted, [it] could cause either the entire
medical benefit plan for all 100-plus employees to be ended, or financial ruin to the
employer." Id. The plaintiff's inability to post bond influenced the court in denying the
motion; had the order been granted and had the employee lost at trial, it was uncertain
whether the employer would have been able to recover the expense of providing continued
coverage for Owens's benefit in the interim. Id. at 416.
93. Id. at 415-16.
94. Deeming v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 1990).
95. Owens, 773 F Supp. at 419 (quoting Deeming, 905 F.2d at 1127).
96. Id. (quoting Deeming, 905 F.2d at 1128).
97. 119 CONG. REc. 30,044 (1973).
98. 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
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It means "originally" or "chiefly," not "exclusively."'0 '0 While protecting
the employee-employer relationship may be the "primary" purpose of
section 510, in any event it is not the exclusive purpose of this broad
provision.
The West court concluded nonetheless that "discrimination, to violate
Section 510, must affect the individual's employment relationship in some
substantial way."'' 1 How the court got from "primary" to "must" is
unclear. To convert a Senate discussion about whether a provision applies
to a particular situation into a statement that the sole purpose of the
provision is to apply to those situations is just not supportable.
There is another reason why it makes little sense to graft the requirement
that a section 510 claim must adversely affect the employee-employer
relationship. Vogel'02 cannot be reconciled with Deeming,'0 West, 04 or
Owens'05 because the employee-employer relationship was not adversely
affected. The employee in Vogel was merely invidiously excluded from the
benefit plan.'06 Even if the defendant in Owens expressly excluded or limited
coverage for the plaintiff by name, as in Vogel, the employee would have
no valid claim under section 510 according to Deeming. It is difficult to
imagine that Congress intended such an absurd result.
Thus, narrowly construing section 510 to apply only to actions that
discriminatorily affect the employee-employer relationship is not supported
by the legislative history or applicable case law. It also creates the paradox
that an employee can only lose benefits if he or she continues to work for
the employer, regardless of whether the employer's intent is invidious. 07 An
100. THE A , mcAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 983 (2d College ed.
1982).
101. West, 621 F.2d at 245-46 (emphasis added).
102. Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990).
103. Deeming v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1990).
104. West, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
105. Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F Supp. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1990), appeal docketed, No.
91-8696 (lth Cir. July 31, 1991) (Owens I, supra note 91).
106. Vogel, 728 F Supp. 1210.
107. Senator Hartke's comments in support of § 510, cited by both the Deeming and West
courts, also mention constructive discharge. Deeming, 905 F Supp. at 1127 n.2; West, 621
F.2d at 245. Arguably, if a post-claim modification is invidious enough to rise to the level of
constructive discharge, the discharge and discrimination cases could be reconciled. However,
such a modification probably would not rise to the level of a constructive discharge. Construc-
tive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions
so intolerable that the employee is forced into voluntary resignation. The concept of constructive
discharge has been applied previously in ERISA cases. See Kreis v. Charles 0. Townley, M.D.
& Assoc., 833 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1987). The conditions of employment must be such that a
"reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The court must examine
both the objective feelings of the employee and the intent of the employer. Meyers v. City of
Cincinnati, 728 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 934 F.2d 726
(6th Cir. 1991). The employee's feelings cannot be unreasonably sensitive. Id. at 481. As well,
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employee cannot lose benefits if he or she is discharged for using them.
Taken together, McGann and Owens appear to provide a clear path for
employers to cut their benefit costs by modifying plans on a post-claim
basis. To successfully enact a post-claim plan modification, the employer
must satisfy at least four criteria. First, employers must include a statement
in their SPD that states clearly that the benefits may be unilaterally changed
at any time. 0 Second, employers must be free of any contracts that bind
them to benefit terms.1°9 Third, the activity on its face must be directed at
the plan and not a specific employee-employer relationsip." 0 Fourth, m
most states, the plan must be self-insured if the post-claim modification
includes placing caps on or excluding particular illnesses but not others."'
This artificially narrow interpretation of section 510 permits employers to
modify health insurance coverage after an employee's need for the coverage
arises. The result is that employers have an excellent way to control health
insurance costs even after the covered illness has been diagnosed and claims
have been filed. The employee is left with a preexisting condition, inadequate
or no health insurance, and no cause of action under ERISA. This harsh
result is not mandated by ERISA, and some actions by both the judiciary
and the legislature could invigorate section 510 as it relates to post-claim
modifications.
the employer is assumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of his or her conduct. Id.
Thus, the dispositive question is whether a post-claim modification of a health benefit makes
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to leave. The
effect of a post-claim modification may, in addition to being financially devastating, be
personally humiliating. Notably, the "psychological impact" in a constructive discharge case
is important.
Yet some problems exist in making this analogy. First, the post-claim modification must be
defined as a "working condition." Generally, courts would define working condition as
something more like the physical and social surroundings, and not particular pay or benefits.
See, e.g., Meyers, 728 F Supp. at 477-82. Second, courts are more likely to find constructive
discharge where the employer cannot provide any reason to justify the different treatment of
similarly situated employees. In this case, the cost of treatment is clearly a concern and at
least one of the reasons the changes were made. Finally, did the employer intend the action
in question-that the employee resign? Arguably, in McGann and Owens the employer was
indifferent as to whether the employee stayed or left. The employer's goal was accomplished
at the time the plan was modified and the employee could no longer receive benefits. For the
purposes of avoiding costs under the plan, it is irrelevant whether the employee stays on or
not. Consequently, the employer probably does not have the intent needed to establish
constructive discharge.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1988).
109. For example, employers cannot be bound by a collective bargaiming agreement regulated
under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
110. Deeming, 905 F.2d at 1127. Indeed, in McGann, counsel for the defendant aptly stated:
"we never terminated McGann. We terminated the plan, and a self-insured company can
offer whatever benefits it wants." Garland, supra note 50 (quoting Mark A. Huvard, attorney
for H & H Music Co.).




Although lacking Congressional underpinnings, the court's point in Moore
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co."' 2 is well taken in light of rising health care
costs that wreak havoc on employers and their employee benefit plans."'
The courts in McGann and Owens both noted that the defendants had
legitimate business reasons for making the changes.1 4 If ERISA prohibits
employers from modifying plans once instituted, some will face financial
hardships from which they will not recover; others, in order to avoid
financial hardships, will merely provide de mininis benefits or none at all.
The McGann court believed any involvement on its part to prevent the
post-claim modification would inappropriately involve the judiciary in what
is the sole domain of the employer-determining what benefits it should
provide to its employees."'
As mentioned above, the result in McGann creates a gap in section 510
protection. The employer wishing to avoid payment of benefits can accom-
plish its end without actually or constructively severing the employee-
employer relationship." 6 Thus, a reasonable approach permits section 510
actions even though the employee-employer relationship remains intact.
Under this scenario, a post-claim modification could possibly state a cause
of action under section 510. Nonetheless, in some instances post-claim
modifications may be necessary if the company and the benefits of the
remaining employees are at risk. The recommendations below could be
followed by the courts in a post-claim modification case. In addition,
Congress could enact changes to ERISA sections 1022 and 510 to more
112. 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).-
113. Id. at 492.
114. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F Supp. 392, 393-94 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co.,
60 U.S.L.W 3638 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1992) (No. 91-1283); Owens v. Storehouse Inc., 773 F Supp.
414, 415 (N.D. Ga. 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-8696 (lith Cir. July 31, 1991) (Owens I,
supra note 91).
115. Specifically, the court said:
McGann interprets section 510 to prevent an employer from reducing or
eliminating coverage for a particular illness in response to the escalating costs of
covering an employee suffering from that illness. Such an interpretation would,
in effect, change the terms of [the] plan. [D]efendants would be
effectively proscribed from reducing coverage for AIDS once McGann contracted
that illness and filed claims for AIDS-related expenses. If a federal court could
prevent an employer from reducing an employee's coverage limits for AIDS
treatment once that employee contracted AIDS, the boundaries of judicial in-
volvement would be sorely tested.
McGann, 946 F.2d at 407-08.
116. Arguably, it seems that the easiest way for the employer to avoid paying pension
benefits is to discharge employees. Thus, § 510 probably works effectively to protect pensions




clearly define the scope of when and how a plan should be modified to
prevent discrimination. Finally, Congress must look anew at ERISA's pre-
emption clause, which has had the inadvertent effect of driving employers
to self-insurance, perhaps contrary to the long-term interests of both em-
ployers and employees.
A. "Grandfather" in Participants with a Preexisting Condition
Unless the Employer Can Prove that it is Economically Unfeasible
An employer should be able to implement a post-claim modification that
interrupts a participant's treatment regimen only if the employer can dem-
onstrate that it is economically unfeasible'i 7 to "grandfather" in the partic-
ular participant with regard to that preexisting condition.18 "Grandfathering"
meets the short-term needs of the participant to have continued coverage
and, if feasible, the long-term need of the employer to modify the plan and
maintain its fiscal integrity. Those who relied on the coverage and now find
themselves with a condition that requires treatment are allowed to have the
treatment continue, while those who do not have such a condition have
notice of what is covered and what is not.
Otherwise, post-claim modifications (under a worst-case scenario) give
employers the luxury of having their proverbial cake and eating it too. They
can attract the best employees with the lure of a plethora of expensive
benefits, and then systematically modify the plan as employees diagnosed
with expensive illnesses file treatment claims. Moreover, employees who rely
on coverage with a reasonable expectation of using the benefits will likely
be unable to obtain coverage elsewhere, after being diagnosed with the
condition. 1 9 "Grandfatherng" prevents a situation where employers enact-
ing post-claim modifications create a whole. new class of persons "who
117. Through the common law of ERISA, courts will need to fashion a working definition
of "unfeasible" over time. The following definition, although drawn from a case which was
ultimately reversed, may be helpful: "[The company] must demonstrate not that the costs of
the medical insurance plan far outweigh the insurance premiums paid by retirees, but rather
that the contractual promises previously made are now avoidable because of some unforeseen
contingency that threatens the financial base of the entire corporation." Musto v. American
Gen. Corp., 615 F Supp. 1483, 1500 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd, 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989); see also Frances Figetakis, Comment, Retiree Welfare
Benefits: ERISA, LMRA, and the Federal Common Law, 20 AKRON L. Rav. 455, 465 (1987).
118. This suggestion has already drawn fire. See David Katz, Employers Need a Moral
Yardstick for AIDS Benefits, NATIONAL UNDE.RWRITER, PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RIsK & BENEIT
MANAGEMENT EDITION, Jan. 6, 1992, Dec. 30, 1992 [sic] (double issue) at 9, 18 (proposing
"grandfather" option). But see Steven Straw, Letter to the Editor, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER,
PROPERTY & CAsuALTY/RIsK & BENEFIT MANAGEMENT EDITION, Mar. 3, 1992, at 59 (attacking
the proposal).
119. Because of the preexisting condition, insurers will either refuse to cover the existing




believe they are covered ... and then find that they aren't."' 20 The
counterargument to such fears, however, is that employers, afraid of losing
good will from both the community and prospective employees, will refrain
from routinely enacting post-claim modifications out of their own economic
interest. 121
Even though welfare benefits do not vest,'2 at least one court has noted
that employees rely on welfare benefits before actually using them.'2 In
fact, welfare benefits represent a primary inducement for accepting and
maintaining employment.Im The company which provides benefits receives
an economic benefit in the form of lower turnover and the attraction of
better workers. Unlimited plan modifications and terminations turn the plan
into a mere gratuity. 25
B. Pro Rata Reductions
If the employer establishes that it is unfeasible to "grandfather" in those
with a preexisting condition, cuts in the plan should be permitted. To avoid
discriminatory impact on any individual, there should be a presumption
that the reductions be made on a pro rata basis. For example, if the
defendant in McGann needed to cut $500,000 from its benefit plan to
remain solvent, it should be proscribed from exacting the cuts from one
illness or category, such as AIDS. The reductions should be prorated across
all categories to a level that would create the $500,000 savings needed.
Thus, adequate cost savings are achieved and no particular party is forced
to bear the entire burden. This approach would jibe with many existing
state insurance laws which already prohibit different cost caps on different
illnesses.
120. Garland, supra note 50 (quoting Robert L. Liebross, attorney with the Amencan
Association of Retired Persons, who submitted a brief supporting McGann). Additionally,
post-claim modifications effectively create a new class of partially-umnsured individuals and
families in society. With Congress already struggling to deal with the millions of people in the
United States without health insurance, one wonders if Congress actually intended ERISA to
permit employers to transfer to the federal government the costs of their beneficiaries' most
expensive illnesses on a post-claim basis.
121. Indeed, employers may feel that they have an implicit contract to provide the "prom-
ised" benefits once claims are submitted, even though ERISA, according to the courts, permits
post-claim modifications. Additionally, employers benefit from providing benefit plans through
lower turnover, less training, and a more talented work force. Daniel Fischel & John H.
Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1105, 1118 (1988).
122. Some commentators have suggested that they should. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 32,
at 1026.
123. Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F Supp. 1483, 1505 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd,
861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
124. See Figetakis, supra note 117, at 465.
125. Musto, 615 F Supp. at 1497.
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Should the employer prefer to institute more targeted reductions, the
burden would shift to the employer to show that these are not retaliatory
or discriminatory. For example, an employer may want to make different
level cuts between preventive benefits, elective benefits, and major medical
benefits, based on some type of targeting or prioritization.
C. Avoid the Unintended Incentive for Becoming Self-Insured
As McGann and Owens demonstrate, employers interested in placing caps
on particular illnesses, most likely through a post-claim modification prompted
by a recent employee claim, must become self-insured in order to make the
change. 26 ERISA's preemption clause umntentionally created this impetus
when it preempted all state law relating to employee benefits, and paradox-
ically and contradictorily, .added an exception that permitted states to
continue regulating their insurance industry. 27 When the Supreme Court
held that the exception does not apply to self-insured plans,'2 the message
became clear: become self-insured and ERISA preemption shields you from
your state's insurance laws. 129 Accordingly, employers, whether or not
competent to manage their own plans, have a statutory incentive to drop
their insurance carrier, become self-insured, and thus maximize their freedom
in deciding what benefits to provide to their employees.
There should be no "accidental" incentive for becoming self-insured.
Two recommendations should help in this area. First, employers who claim
to be self-insured but hire an insurance company to manage their plan or
secure "stop loss" insurance should be subject to state insurance laws. 130
Courts should therefore interpret state statutes to allow those who benefit
from and rely on the insurance industry in the implementation of their
plans to be subject to the laws of that industry.'3'
Second, Congress could amend ERISA section 514132 to exempt state-
mandated benefit laws from ERISA preemption. This would reverse the
126. Garland, supra note 50.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A) (1988).
128. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Bruner, supra note 6, at 1116-17.
129. See also Thomas B. Stoddard, Now You're Insured, Now You're Not, N.Y. TamS,
May 23, 1992, at 23.
130. Some states permit employers to hire insurance companies to admimster their self-
insured plan or allow employers to purchase "stop loss" insurance and still retain their self-
insured status. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative
Process and Health Policy, 7 Am. J. TAx PoL'y 47, 63-65 (1988). Generally speaking, "stop
loss" insurance is coverage that the self-insured employer obtains to protect itself from either
an unusually large number of claims or an extremely expensive one. In short, "stop loss"
insurance provides protection against unanticipated expenses. 2 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note
5.
131. This proposal has been raised by at least one commentator. Fox & Schaffer, supra
note 130, at 63-64.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
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statutory incentive toward self-insurance. In the absence of strong federal
leadership in welfare benefit protection, states are familiar enough with
their industries, markets, and governmental structure to protect the interests
of their citizens. They can identify what benefits should be mandated.
ERISA should not be allowed to preempt laws relating to the content of
benefits since ERISA is silent on this issue.' With regard to welfare benefits,
ERISA should be a floor, not a ceiling.
D. The Need for National Health Insurance
Tis Note would be remiss if it did not underscore the need for the
United States to join other industrial democracies in implementing a com-
prehensive national health insurance program. With such a program, this
entire Note would be moot. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the rising
cost of health care associated with welfare benefit plans is crippling both
employers who provide such coverage and employees who lack such cov-
erage. '34
The cost of employee benefit plans, particularly health benefits, continues
to rise much faster than inflation 35 and constitutes a large share of em-
ployers' expenses 36 and employees' compensation. 3 7 In the absence of
assistance from the federal government, employers must find ways to cut
costs to protect the solvency of their plans and to remain competitive in a
world market economy. 38 Conversely, all but the wealthiest individuals
remain dependent upon employee welfare benefit plans to cover the expen-
sive costs of care-especially for serious catastrophic illness.139 Thus, both
133. Stoddard, supra note 129.
134. See, e.g., Congressional Action on Health Reform Unlikely This Session, Borzi Tells
ABA, 19 PENs. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1485 (Aug. 17, 1992) (stating that health care costs at
General Motors Corporation alone total three billion dollars annually).
13-5. "Over the past three decades, with the sole exception of the two oil shock years, health
care has outstripped CPI [Consumer Price Index] growth... [H]ealth care inflation [has
increased] at two or more times the rate of CPI growth " Health Care for the
Uninsured: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health for Families and the Uninsured of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, (part 2 of 2), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1990) (statement of
Walter B. Maher, director, Fed. Relations, Human Resources Office, Chrysler Corp.).
136. See, e.g., id. at 163.
137. Id. at 234 (statement of Health Policy Coalition).
138. "[Health care] inefficiency is creating an enormous economic effect on our international
competitiveness." Id. at 4 (statement of Hon. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Senator from Michigan,
Chairman of Subcomm. on Health for Families and the Uninsured). For example, Chrysler
Corporation reported that the cost of health insurance for current and retired workers is $700
per car for cars produced in the United States. The cost of health care per car on Chryslers
built "across the river" in Canada is only $200. Id. at 4-5.
139. For example, the average lifetime tab for treating AIDS is $75,000, and this is by no
means the most expensive of all catastrophic illnesses. Garland, supra note 50. For discussion
of the costs of treating AIDS relative to other catastrophic illnesses, see Sohlgren, supra note
64; Schatz, supra note 64.
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employers and employees have an interest in shifting the actual costs of an
illness to each other-regardless of whether it is covered by the existing
benefit plan. Employees who become ill want their employer to honor its
"promise" to provide the services prescribed in the plan. Employers, absent
any explicit contractual obligations, want the right to modify their plans
any time and for any reason.
The energy expended in this colossal loss-shifting game is wasteful social
and economic activity which, when the dust clears, leaves approximately
forty million Americans either umnsured or underinsured. Even when an
employer successfully enacts a post-claim modification excluding someone
who now has a preexisting condition, if that illness is financially cata-
strophic, the employee will likely end up on Medicaid, with public funds
ultimately paying for the cost of care anyway. Thus, while a full discussion
of national health insurance is clearly beyond the scope of this Note, the
very problems discussed here urgently beckon such a system.
With specific regard to the McGann case, the Supreme Court, in deciding
whether to grant certiorari, invited the Solicitor General in March, 1992 to
submit a brief.' 4° The Bush Administration, because of alleged differences
within the Cabinet,' 4' did not file a brief until October 16, 1992.142 Earlier,
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had argued that
McGann should be overruled by the Supreme Court. 43 Since more than
half of all employees now work for companies that have self-insured plans,
the prospect of losing benefits the moment one needs them most threatens
to undercut the nation's private health insurance system and greatly concerns
DHHS. However, the Labor Department strongly supported maintaining
the employer's absolute right to modify its plan, especially given rising
costs. The Administration apparently followed the Labor Department in
taking its stand that the lower courts were correct in permitting H & H
Music to enact a post-claim modification of its benefit plan.' 44
CONCLUSION
The rising cost of employee health benefits presents a substantial challenge
to employers in their efforts to both provide benefits to their employees
and still remain solvent. While ERISA does not requre employers to provide
140. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 112 S. Ct. 1556 (1992), reviewing petition for cert.
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
141. See Malcom Gladwell, When Benefits Changes Leave Employees Vulnerable: AIDS
Case Targets Federal Self-Insurance Law, WASH. PosT, Aug. 20, 1992, at Ai, A4.
142. AIDS Victim Had Insurance Slashed by Employer (CNN News, Oct. 16, 1992), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File [hereinafter AIDS Victim]. The Bush Admnimstration filed
a brief supporting the demal of certiorari. Id.
143. Pear, supra note 4.
144. AIDS Victim, supra note 142.
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benefits, it does regulate the plans of employers who choose to provide
benefits. Overall, ERISA provides an adequate mechanism for regulating
benefits and preventing wrongful discharges by employers to avoid paying
benefits.
However, as the post-claim modification cases demonstrate, ERISA has
some blind spots. In section 510 actions, courts have begun interpreting the
interference provision narrowly to exclude discriminatory actions that fail
to impair the employee-employer relationship. Courts have also held that
since employers have an absolute right to modify their welfare benefit plans,
no analysis of intent is necessary when the proposed change theoretically
applies to all plan participants. It is simply not prohibited conduct, no
matter how invidious. As this Note has shown, the case law and legislative
history certainly do not demand this harsh result. Employees who rely on
a plan, file a claim, and are then subject to a post-claim modification, have
no realistic expectation of securing new health insurance and must bear the
cost of the illness. In many cases, individuals will deplete their assets until
they are eligible for Medicaid or other public assistance.
Because courts interpret ERISA so narrowly, ignoring its sister statute,
section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 141 ERISA needs fine
tumng. Section 510 must be interpreted in the same manner as section
8(a)(3). While the courts conceivably have power to make these changes
under the common law of ERISA, Congress should, in the absence of
judicial action, amend ERISA to provide a structure for permitting post-
claim modifications only when it is infeasible to "grandfather" in partici-
pants with a preexisting condition. Such modifications, unless the employer
establishes that they are not retaliatory, should be pro rata across all illness
categories. In the interim, Congress should also look at ERISA to eliminate
any artificial incentives for self-insurance. Employers should become self-
insured only when it is in the overall interest of the plan, not to avoid state
insurance laws which prohibit cost-cap discrimination between categories of
disease. Finally, both employers and employees would benefit substantially
from a national health system that spreads these catastrophic losses, which
individuals and all but the largest employers are unable to bear, over society
as a whole.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
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